Tarkasangra... ed. with an Engl. tr. by J. Vidyasagara

Annam Bhaṭṭa
TARKASANGRAHA
BY
ANNA BHATTA.

EDITED WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION
BY
PANDIT JIBANANDA VIDYASAGARA B. A.

Calcutta:
PRINTED AT THE SARASUDHANIDHI PRESS.
1872.

To be had from Pandit Jibananda Vidyasagara B. A. Govt. Sanskrit College of Calcutta.
ब्रवतरणिका।
प्रश्नम् परमामानं श्रीजीवानन्दं मन्त्रकर।
इलंकंभाषयं तर्कसंग्रहीयमनूयदते ॥ १ ॥
प्रायो दूर्परयतनेष्विष्ट भाषितेषु
लोकः समाणितिरतिप्राधिता समन्तात् ॥
इलंकंभाषितमः सुमतं जनानां
तत्पाठवेन महििमानसुपैति लोकः ॥ २ ॥
तदाद्रेिवापरभाषितेषु
श्रवा परं दीयते एवं वृष्णाम्।
तेषां प्रचारेिय च सर्वेऽद्विश्
प्रायो विखंिितरश्राश्चरचैं ॥ ३ ॥
संस्कारयुतां विदुषां विरं मनाकः
इलंकंभाषाः स्वतंभाषाः।
थथा प्रचारेियेत सुतंकविधा
तथा सम्बोधाय नमैशं यतः ॥ ४ ॥
तेषां विबोधनकरं निजभाषेऽवेष
हाकृत्तर्विलस्तिनविद्या विषता पुरा या।
रायेण्हक्तवर्षेष च भिन्नशाखः
सवादनेन विवुषया विश्लोकतासा ||

tयोः काचित्त पञ्चां काचिदपि च तत्तत्तवचन्तो
चर्चीला सार्वशः सहितसुपार्मतापि च मया ।
अनुदेशां श्राव्यो विचित्रितमिव लक्षणगिराः
हि खानं दृत्ता सपालयं जिव्वाः सहमिमम् ||
श्रोद्रामोद्गर्गोविन्दः समान्कृत् हिन्यान: ।
प्रीत्याक्षेति च मया यम्म्येऽस्येयं विनिविभित: ||

ठद्ध ध्रुवतगोध मण्डलिति काचितः
विद्ववरैरेष विमार्जनीयः ।

d्रोषासन्धानपरा न सन्तो
शुष्कणपत्रः प्रथिताद्वि लोकः ||

चेष्टा हितार्थाय जता मध्या
तेष्व चुदे खायदिः सा समर्था ।

tदेव मे यज्ञचयं फलपदः
न च नायथेयेव विचित्रनीयम् ||

मः संक्षेपाद्वाहैवेदं मिति चैरणुचिम मया ।

निष्काय सुद्रिताय यवान्तु तर्कंतत्स्वार्धीपिका ||
TRANSLATION
OF THE
TARKA SANGRAHA.

1. "Having treasured in my mind the Lord of the universe, and having taken the dust of the feet of my preceptor, this collection of the Philosophical Discussions, is made by me, to make the subject easy to the understanding of those who are not well off in the subject."

2. "There are seven categories (padarthas);—I. Substance (dravya), II. Quality (guna), III. Action (karma), IV. Generality (samanya), V. Particularity (vishesha), VI. Intimate Relation (samavaya), VII. negation (abhava).

Padartha is not exactly what Aristotle meant by category; but as most of Aristotle’s categories refer to classes of existence or to what is most nearly related to them, and as in modern philosophy the term category expresses almost universally this meaning, we may safely adopt it here, viz. as referring to the notions, which express the general forms of knowledge or what is the same, the general modes of existence.

There are different sets of Categories according to different schools of philosophy. Those of Aristotle are as follows:—

Those of Zoroaster are as follows:—
I. Sensation. II. Intelligence. III. Judgment. IV. Conscience. V. Life.
Those of Locke are as follows:—
I. Extension. II. Solidity. III. Mobility. IV. Perceptibility. V. Motivity. VI. Perceptibility. VII. Motivity. VIII. Existence. IX. Duration. X. Number.

The number of seven categories is adopted by the Veiseshikas, and also acknowledged by the followers of the Nyaya, as established in the Bhashya.

Kanada acknowledged only the six Categories, excluding negation. Gautama, the founder of the Nyaya, enumerates under the head of objects of proof (categories.)

1. Soul, 2. body, 3. sense, 4. object of sense, 5. intellect, 6. mind, 7. activity, 8. fault, 9. condition of the soul after death (transmigration), 10. retribution, 11. pain
2. deliverance from pain.

The enumeration of the Subdivisions of Categories.

3. "The Substances are nine in number: 1. earth (prithivi), 2. Water (ab), 3. light (tejas), 4. air (vayu), 5. ether (akasa), 6. time (kala), 7. space (dik), 8. soul (atman), 9. mind (manas)."

Time and space are here classed as substances, because the word substance is employed to signify that to which qualities can be attributed. To explain this more fully, it is the substratum of qualities either in the relation of intimate union (samavaya sambandha) or in the relation of antecedent negation (pragabhava) that is of future existence.

4. "The qualities are twenty-four in number,"

5. "There are five actions.

1. Throwing upwards (utkshepana), 2. throwing downwards (abakshepana), 3. contracting (akunchana) 4. expanding (prasarana), 5. going on (gamana)."

The last of these, viz gamana or "motion in general, includes all sorts of motion not mentioned before.

6. "Generality is considered two fold, extensive (para) and non-extensive (apara)."

These correspond to genus and species. Existence, referring substances, qualities and actions is called extensive. The class which differs from this is called non-extensive; substantiality and similar notions are extensive and non-extensive. It is called extensive by its including many things; by its being included in a more extensive class it is non-extensive.

6. 'But the ultimate conditions of eternal Substances such as mind, Soul, time, place and the atoms of which the earth, water &c. are composed) are called particularities which are endless.'

Such is the relation of a substance with its composing parts, as of a jar, &c. with its two halves, &c.; further the relation of substances with qualities and actions,
and lastly the relation of substances, qualities and actions with their respective classes is called intimate relation. Intimate relation means constant relation.

7. "But the intimate relation is of only one kind."

"Negation or non-existence (abhava) is of four kinds;—antecedent negation (pragabhava, or the state of a thing before it began to be), destruction (pradhansabhava), absolute negation (atyantabhava), reciprocal negation (anyonnyabhava.)"

Negation is the reciprocal negation of the six categories, that is to say negation arises from the six categories being denied of each other. Negation is two-fold, universal negation and mutual negation. Universal negation is negation, different from mutual negation. Mutual negation is the negation of identity. Universal negation is of three kinds, antecedent, emergent, and absolute negation. In this half, a jar is to be produced; in this half a jar is to be destroyed; there is no jar; these are respectively the three negations, mentioned above.

Having thus classified the categories, the author proceeds to consider in detail each of the subdivisions.

8. "Earth has the peculiar quality of smell. It is of two kinds—eternal and non-eternal. It is eternal in the form of atoms; non-eternal in the form of aggregates or products viz. if consisting of two three &c. atoms."

The non-eternity of earth in the form of products indicates the want of permanence in the forms, such as jars, &c, which it may take. The jar, when broken to pieces as atoms, is no longer a jar, but the earth, of which it is composed, still remains. The existence of eternal atoms has been a favorite theory of several schools.
of philosophy. Among the Greeks, Epicurus is one of the most renowned of the maintainers of the atomic theory. The doctrine has been resumed by some modern chemists, not as an established fact but as a hypothesis which supplies terms very advantageous in enunciating the chemical laws of Definite Proportions.

"It (earth composed of parts) again is of three kinds, through the division of organized body (sarira organ of sense (indriga), object or inorganic matter (vishaya). We the mortals possess the organized body of the earth; the smell is the organ of sense of the earth, which receives odour, residing in the core part of the nose; the inorganic matter of the earth is clay, stone and the like."

9. "Water is cool to the feel. And this (water is of two kinds—eternal and non-eternal, eternal, in the shape of atoms and non-eternal in the shape of products from the by-atomical to the highest compound.

"These compounds are again of three kinds;—the organized body; the organ of sense, and the inorganic matter.

Its organized body is to be met with in the realms of Varuna (or Neptune); its organ of sense is tongue (rasana) which relishes taste, residing in the fore-part of the tongue; its inorganic matters or objects (visayas) are rivers, seas, &c."

10. "Light is hot to the feel. It is of two sorts—eternal in the form of atoms and non-eternal or transient in the form of compounds. These products or compounds are again of three kinds:—the organized body, the organ of sense and the inorganic
matter. It is well known that the organized body of light abides in the solar realm; the organ of sense of light is sight (chakhas) the recipient of colour, residing in the forepart of the black pupil of the eye; inorganic light is of four sorts, according to the division of earthy (bhauma), celestial (divya), intestinal (audarya) and mineral (akaryja). Earthy light, is that of fire, &c. celestial light is such as lightening &c. is without fuel. Intestinal is the cause of the digestion of what is eaten and drunk. Mineral light is found in mines, as gold, &c."

The Nyaya philosophy considers light and heat as one and the same thing. Modern chemists have found out curious resemblances not only between light and heat but also between these and electricity and magnetism; but whether they are materially the same or different has not yet been ascertained by experiment and examination. In the Nyaya the organ of seeing is supposed to be a ray of light emitted forth by the centre of the eye towards the external object that is seen. The Buddhists suppose that the organ of seeing is the pupil of the eye itself. The optists of the present day affirm that we see an object not because a ray emanates from the pupil of the eye towards the object viewed and illuminates it, but because the object reflects light on the retina of the eye.

The theory of the intestinal heat appears to be a prediction of Leibig's doctrine of digestion which ascribes to the body the function of a furnace having the food as fuel.

As the strongest heat of a furnace is unequal to calcine gold or turn it into an earthly looking oxide, it is supposed by the Naiyayikas as a lucid substance and not an earthly matter like the other metals.
In the Mimansa, gold is considered as a different substance altogether. This theory is adopted by the modern chemists of Europe.

11. "The feel in the air is considered peculiar to itself. The air is also supposed to have no colour. It is of two kinds, eternal and non-eternal:—eternal in the form of atoms—and non-eternal in the form of compounds or products. These compounds again are of three kind:—I. The organized body; II. the organ of sense and III. the inorganic matter. The organized bodies of air are in the aerial region (evil spirits, such as the pisachas); its organ of sense the percipient of touch, is the skin (twak) which extends over the whole body. Its inorganic matters are those which cause the trembling of the trees and the like."

12. "The air that circulates within the body is called the vital air (prana) and this, though single, receives the different denominations of breathing, flatulence &c. through the distinction of modifying circumstances.

13. "The distinguishing quality of the ether is sound. It ts one, all pervading, and eternal. Time (kala), though one is the cause of the employment of the terms past and the like. It is all pervading and eternal."

The element of ether is inferred in order to account for sound. As pure air and water are destitute of smell, it has been concluded by the Naiyayikas that the smell is the distinctive proof of earth:—the perception of savour depending on the presence of moisture in the mouth, it was concluded that the sense of taste must be aqueous in its nature:—the relation between light and vision was plain enough:—and the air having been
appropriated to the sense of touch, which surrounds the whole body just as the air usually surrounds it, there remains nothing else to support the uniformity of the system than to infer a fifth 'elementary essence for the substratum of sound which elementary essence is designa-
ted as ether. A fifth element, under the denomination of Quintessence, was acknowledged by the antient philosophers of Europe, though with a different signification from that of the Nyaya system.

The doctrine that the organs of sense must resemble in their nature the objects which they were to apprehend is equivalent to the doctrine of a long predominance in Europe:—“that a cause must resemble its effect.” It is in some points, the converse of the theory of ideas or sensible forms. In that theory outward bodies were supposed to emit forth refined images of themselves to the mind through the organs of sense. Here, on the other hand, the mind is supposed to send forth an organ of sense towards its object in the external world, resembling the object itself.

Thus bright bodies are represented as being viewed by means of a ray of light that emanates from the eye, and which constitutes the sense of sight.

Time, the producer of all productions, is the substrate of the world. This is proved by the perception of the "now". If for instance the perception: "here is now a jar," is given there exists a union between the motion of the sun and the jar. This is not conjunction or any other relation (for conjunction is between the parts of two or more things,) but it is a relation of a different kind, which is produced by time. That time is to be thought under the notion of a substratum, is evident from its being the cause of priority and posteriority. Time is the special (non-general) cause of the perception.
f priority and posteriority. Or if both definitions are combined. Time is the substrate of the special union, which is the non-intimate cause of priority and posteriority.

Although one, it has many names, viz moment, hour, day &c., past, future and present time. Past is the time, whose destruction is the present, as yesterday; future is the time, whose future existence is present, as to-morrow, and present is the time, whose future existence is destroyed and whose destruction is (to come to pass) future, as to-day. There will, after every future moment, be another moment, because there will be always another action (the junction of which with other things produces the relation of time); this will be cause at the general conflagration, where also the terms of "moment," "day," &c. are applied.

14. "Space (dik) is the cause of the use of the terms eastern and the like. It is one, eternal, and all-pervading (or infinite.)"

15. "The repository of knowledge is the Soul (atman). It is of two kinds—the human Soul, and the divine Soul. The divine Soul is God who is Omniscient and one only—devoid of happiness and misery. The human Soul is different in each human body and is infinite and eternal."

The reason ascribed for the theory that the human soul is infinite is this, that, wherever the body goes, there the soul too is present. The human soul is the intimate cause of happiness and unhappiness &c., and the substantiality of it is proved by its being the substratum of the qualities: happiness and unhappiness. Since such causes as merit and demerit do not exist with regard to God or the divine Soul, he is not subject to either happiness and unhappiness.
The human Soul governs the organs of sense, &c because it successively, produces the conscience of the senses and of the body. Although there is in the soul the perception: I know, I am happy, &c., yet it cannot at first be proved against one who holds the contrary opinion, that the soul is something different from the body, &c. To prove this, it is said that "an instrument must possess its agent." As an instrument, has no effect without an agent, so also the eye and the other senses, which are the instruments for knowledge, have no effect without an agent. For this reason an independent agent is assumed.

To show, that the body is not the agent, it is urged that "there is no consciousness in the body, as is proved by the disappearance of consciousness after death," and also "if consciousness belonged to the body, there could in old age be no recollection of things, perceived in childhood, the body being subject to increase and decrease by acquiring and losing its particles," consciousness can neither belong to the senses; for if such were the case, how could recollection remain, when the senses are destroyed?

Let then consciousness not belong to the senses (external) but be maintained for the eternal mind to which the answer is:—the mind cannot be the site of consciousness;—for then knowledge and other internal qualities would remain imperceptible. Because as the mind is an atom, and as the cause of every perception is a certain greatness, no perception could take place, if knowledge, happiness, &c. were placed in the eternal mind. How mind is an atom, is explained afterwards. Consciousness then must belong to the soul.

Having finished the account of substance, the author goes on to treat of quality.
16. "Mind (manas) is that organ of sense which is instrumental to the apprehension of happiness and misery &c. It is endless, as each soul possesses one mind. It is in the form of an atom and is eternal."

The Naiyayikas are of opinion that the mind is small, as an atom, because if it were infinite, as the Mīmāṃsakas uphold, it might be in union with all substances simultaneously, and all sensations might be contemporaneous. Various sensations, the Naiyayikas maintain, do not arise at once to the same soul. They only appear to do so when passing in rapid succession; as a firebrand, whirled with velocity, looks like a ring of fire.

Of Qualities.

17. "The quality, that is apprehended by the eye only, is colour. Through the division of white, blue yellow, red, green, orange, and variegated, it is of seven kinds. All these seven colours are to be found in earth. The colour that is to be found in water is non-resplendent white. In light it is to be found both white and bright,"

The great Newton has discovered that the colour is in light only, and that a ray of light can be analysed into all the seven primary colours by means of a glass-prism. He has also proved by experiment that the variety of colours that is visible in the universe is owing to the variety of powers which different objects possess to absorb some primary colours and to emit forth the residue of the ray.

18. "The quality that is apprehended by the tongue is taste. And that is of six kinds through
the division of sweet, acid, saline, bitter, astringent, and pungent. All these six qualities of taste can be had in earth but in water the sweet taste can only be found."

19. "The quality that is apprehended by the nose is smell. And it is of two kinds, fragrance and non-fragrance which exist in earth only."

(20) "The quality that is apprehensive only by the organ of touch is feel. It is three-fold, cold, hot, and temperate (ie neither cold nor hot). It exists in earth, water, light, and air. The feel that is in water is cold, the feel that is in light is hot, and the feel that is in both the earth and air is neither cold nor hot."

Feel is perceived by the skin, it is the cause of perception through the skin. It is three-fold, tepid, cold, and warm. Hardness and similar qualities are in the earth. It is eternal in the atoms of water, light, and air, non-eternal in the atoms of earth.

The qualities of colour, taste, smell, and feel, as abiding in earth, they are produced by a cause, because by the union with fire, the colour, taste, and smell and feel of earth are changed; not so as abiding in water, &c. be a hundred times boiled, yet no change of its colour, &c. takes place. The smell and heat of water, on the other hand, are artificial, because they are present or absent by the presence or absence of artificial means, like the cold feel of air and earth.

The Vaiseshikas affirm, that as to earth the change by the process of cooking takes place in the atoms. Their view is, as follows:—as long as the parts are retained in the compound, no change by the process of cooking is possible; but when by the union of fire the compound
substances have been destroyed, that change takes place in the atoms which have become independent of each other. And again by the union of the atoms which have been changed by the process of cooking, a production is effected from the compound of two, three, &c. atoms again to a compound of many parts; for by the extraordinary velocity of heat the transition from the destruction of one compound to the production of another is sudden. Then from the destruction of a compound of two atoms, by a new production, a compound possessed of shape, &c., is formed in a few moments.

The Naiyayikas on the other hand affirm, that in compounds also, viz, in compounds of two, three &c., atoms, change by the process of cooking takes place. Their opinion is as follows:—The compound substances have pores, the minute parts of fire enter into the inside, and therefore change by the process of cooking is possible although the parts be retained in the compound.

(21) “The four qualities, colour &c., which are produced by the application of heat, are transient; but when they are not produced by the application of heat, they are either eternal or non-eternal or transient:—they are eternal in the eternal matters (atoms) and non-eternal or transient in the non-eternal or transient matters (objects produced, such as compounds.”

(22)“ The non-general or special cause of the application of the terms one, &c., is Number. It pervades all the nine substances. Beginning from one, it reaches to the highest numerical figure (pararddha.) Unity is either eternal or non-eternal; eternal when appertains to objects eternal, and non-eternal or tran-
sient when pertains to objects non-eternal or trans-
sient. But duality, &c., are every where non
eternal or transient."

The highest numerical figure "parardha" is "many
lacks of karors." The transient unity means this:—
that when an object is broken into two pieces, it leaves
on the moment, its character of unity and assumes the
character of duality.

(23) "The non-general or special cause of the use of
measure, is Quantity. It abides in all the nine
substances; and it is of four kinds, minute and great,
longe and short."

(24) "The non-general or special cause of the appli-
cation of the term separate, is Individuality, which
quality abides in all the substances."

(25) "The special or non-general cause of the
use of the term "connected," is conjunction. It
pervades all the substances."

(26) "Disjunction is that quality which causes the
destruction of conjunction. All the substances are
to site."

"Distance and proximity or priority and pos-
teriority are the two special or non-general causes
of the application of the terms far and near, ancient
and recent. Having been incident to four substances
beginning with the earth and to the mind, they are
of two kinds what is made by space and what is
made by time. With reference to an object placed
far off, there is the distance made by space. With
reference to an object placed near, there is proximity
made by space. When an object is old there is priority
with reference to time. When an object is young, there is posteriority with reference to time."

(27) "The instrumental cause of a body's beginning to fall is weight or gravity which abides in earth and water."

(28) "The instrumental cause of the first commencement of tickling is Fluidity which abides in earth, water and light. It is of two kinds:—natural (or primary) and adscititious (or secondary). It is natural (or primary, in water and adscititious (or secondary i.e produced by something else) in earth and light. In earthly substances such as clarified butter, &c, fluidity is caused by the application of heat."

(29) "The quality that causes infinitesimal particles to assume the shape of a mass is Viscidity: It exists in water alone."

The Naiyaikas maintain that oily Substances are viscid, only because they contain water. This phenomenon according to modern Chemists falls under the category of attraction of cohesion.

(30) "The quality that is appreded by the organ of hearing (Sotra) is sound (Sabda). It is two-fold, inarticulate and articulate. Inarticulate sound is that of a bugle, &c. Articulate Sound is in the form of the Sanscrit and other languages."

(31) "The quality that is the cause of the appplication of all terms is intellect or knowledge (buddhi). It is of two kinds, Memory and Apprehension. Knowledge (or a state of consciousness), which is caused by the internal reflexion of previous impressions (Sanskara
is called memory (smrīti). Knowledge different from that, is called apprehension (anuvāba). That is of two kinds, true apprehension and false apprehension.

(32) "Apprehension of an object in its real nature, is true apprehension. Thus the knowledge that 'it is silver' which we arrive at after, seeing true silver is called true apprehension. That is truly called the pramaṇa i.e knowledge unmistakeable. False apprehension is that which indicates a nature that does not belong to the object of which the apprehension is formed. For instance, the apprehension 'This is silver' in a pearl-shell is a false apprehension."

(33) "True apprehension is of four kinds:—
preceptions, inferences, comparisons and testimonies. Their causes are also four-fold, viz. perception inference, comparison, and testimony."

True apprehension is an apprehension without error. It is not perceived but by itself, by the concurrence of doubts. The Mimansakas say, that true apprehension is comprehended by itself. According to the Gurus a knowledge is a true apprehension by its own manifestation.

According to the opinion of the Muraṇimitraśas knowledge is obtained by reflection.

(34)" An efficient cause, that is not general to many effects, is called a special cause. That antecedent which invariably and unconditionally precedes an effect is called a cause. That is called an effect, of which, there was a previous non-existence."

(35) "Cause is three-fold, through the divisions of intimate, non-intimate, and instrumental. That from which in its intimate relation an effect is
produced is called an intimate cause, as threads are of cloth, and the cloth itself of its own colour, &c.

Where the cause and effect are associated in one and the same object, that cause is called non-intimate; such as the conjunction of the threads is the non-intimate cause of cloth, and the colour of the threads is that of the cloth itself; and the third, that is, the instrumental cause must be considered, what is different from either, such as the weaver's brush, the loom, &c., are of cloth. Among these three kinds of causes, that cause which is not general, is called the instrumental cause."

(36) "The instrumental cause of preception is sensation; sensation is the knowledge that is produced by the union of an organ of sense with an external object. This knowledge, which is called sensation, is two-fold; what admits of an alternative and what does not. The knowledge that admits of an alternative is indefinite, such as in the simple notion that "this is some-thing." The knowledge that does not admit of an alternative is definite such as, in the positive cognitions of 'this is Dittha' & 'This is a Brahman,' 'This is black.'

(37) "The Intercourse (Sannikarsa) of an organ of sense with an external object, which is the instrumental cause of preception, is of six kinds as follows:—

I. Conjunction, II. intimate union with that which is in conjunction, III. intimate union with what is intimately united with that which is in conjunction, IV. intimate union, V. intimate union with that which is intimately united, and VI. the union which arises from the relation between the
thing qualified and the thing that qualifies. For instance, when the perception of a jar takes place by the intercourse of an organ of sight, there the intercourse is conjunction. In the perception of the colour of the jar, there the intercourse is the intimate union with that which is in conjunction, for the colour is intimately united with the jar which is in conjunction with the organ of sight. In the perception of the presence of the generality of colour, there the intercourse is the intimate union with what is intimately united with that which is in conjunction, for in the colour that is intimately united with the jar which is in conjunction with the organ of sight, is inherent in the generic property of being coloured. In the perception of sound by the organ of hearing, there the intercourse is intimate union, for the ether pervading the cavity of the ear, is the organ of hearing, and sound being the specific quality of ether, and there being an intimate relation between a quality and a thing possessing that quality. In the perception of the generic property of sound, the intercourse is the intimate union with that which is intimately united. In the perception of negation, the intercourse is the union which arises from the relation between the thing qualified and the thing that qualifies, for in the perception that 'this ground is possessed with the negation of a jar' there the ground that is in conjunction with the organ of sense is distinguished by the specific quality of the negation of a jar. Thus the knowledge that is produced by these intercourses of six kinds is called perception. The instrumental cause of that perception are the organs
of sense. Therefore the organs of sense are acknowledged to be the authority of perception. Thus ends the chapter on Sensation and Perception."

The author then goes on to the chapter on Inference.

INFERENCE.

(38.) "The act of inferring (something unknown from the known data) is called inference."

"An inference is knowledge arrived at from a logical deduction. This consists in the knowledge of a general principle combined with the knowledge that the case in question is one to which it is applicable. For instance, the knowledge that 'this hill is possessed with smoke, which is invariably attended by fire' is a logical premise, the knowledge deduced from which, viz. that 'this hill is fiery' is a logical inference. The generality of a principle (Vyapti) consists in the inseparable connection of one given thing with some other as in the instance that 'wherever there is smoke there is fire.' The existence of the thing which forms the middle term (Vyapya) of a Syllogism, in the thing which forms the subject of the conclusion or the minor term (Paksha) is called the generality of principle of being in the minor term."

The special cause (instrumental cause) of an inference is the knowledge of the invariable connection of the subject with the predicate in a general proposition (Vyapti-jnana).

For instance, let a man who from the smoke on a hearth, &c. has become aware of the invariable
connection of smoke with fire, see afterwards anywhere on a mountain uninterrupted line of smoke. He will then recollect the general proposition that 'smoke is invariably connected with fire.' Hence arises the knowledge, that 'this mountain is possessed with smoke which is invariably connected with fire' thence arises the knowledge that 'this mountain is fiery' which is an inference.

The ancients held, that smoke, when actually perceived, together with the notion, that it is invariably connected with fire, is the special cause of a conclusion. The modern philosophers deny this; for they say, if the reason (Linga, sign) were the special cause of the conclusion, then inference could not take place, if the reason (sign) had not yet arrived, or had been destroyed; because then the reason, the pretended special cause of a conclusion, was not present.

It is difficult to find an adequate word for the term (Vyapti) in English. It means literally, pervading inherence, the inherent and essential presence of any one thing or property in another, but it is used in the Nyaya and other philosophical systems to denote the logical relation of one notion to another in a proposition of such a kind, that under circumstances an inference may be drawn from it; or it is the relation of the subject to the predicate and vice versa, as the major proposition of a syllogism. The subject of such a proposition is the (Vyapya) the notion, which is pervaded by another (by the predicate) that is to say, which is only a part of the predicate, which is less extensive than the latter, or included in it. The subject is therefore invariably connected with the predicate and if the former is thought, the latter also is thought. The predicate is the
(Vyapaka,) the pervading notion; it has a greater extent than the subject, and the latter is only a part of it. It is, therefore, not invariably connected with it, and if the predicate is thought, the subject is not necessarily thought with it. The Vyapti is, accordingly, only understood, if the relation of the two notions, to be connected together, on either part is understood. Further, the Vyapti is a proposition, from which an inference can be derived, that is to say, it must be a general proposition, fit to form the major proposition of a Syllogism. The names of Vyapya and Vyapaka are only used with reference to the general proposition; if a third term (the minor term) is connected with them, they obtain other names, Viz; the Vyapya (middle term) the name of Hetu, reason, argument, or linga, sign, and the Vyapaka (major term) the name of Sadhya, conclusion. The minor term (the subject of the conclusion) is called Paksha: place (minor term, subject of the conclusion) viz the place, to be connected by means of the middle term with the major term, or predicate of the conclusion.

The knowledge of the determination of the reason (middle term) which is determined by a general predicate, (major term) in connection with the place (minor term) is the special cause of a conclusion. This can be comprehended in a double manner, either, it is the knowledge, that the subject of the general proposition (the middle term,) is connected with the place (subject of conclusion, minor term) or, it is the knowledge, that the place (subject of conclusion) is possessed of the subject of the general proposition (middle term.) Accordingly the conclusion takes place either from the knowledge, that the subject of the general proposition (middle term) is connected with the place (subject, minor term) from
which follows that the conclusion (predicate of the conclusion, major term) is connected with the place (minor term) or it takes place from the knowledge, that the place (minor term) is possessed of the subject of the general proposition (middle term) from which follows, that the place (minor term) is possessed of the conclusion (major term.)

The knowledge of the attribute (middle term) of the subject (of conclusion) as determined by the predicate (major term) with which it is invariably connected takes place through intimate relation, and produces the conclusion by the same relation.

This is on the whole an excellent exposition of the logical relation of the conclusion. It is here lucidly explained in what manner the three notions of a syllogism are in relation to each other, and also that the cause of the conclusion is not the middle term, as separated from the major term, but only in its connection with it. As this is sometimes not attended to, it is not superfluous to attach importance to it. At the same time it is true, that the logical form of a syllogism does not consist of one premise, and the conclusion but of two premises whith one conclusion; for if one reflects as to the form, viz. the minor term in connection with the middle term, which is itself determined by the major term, it is evident, that there are two connections viz. of the minor term with the middle, and of this with the major. That is to say, there are two propositions or two premises.

(39) "The process of Inference is of two kinds, for one's own self, and for the sake of others. That which is for one's own self, is the cause of deduction of a logical inference in one's own mind;
for instance, having made repeated and personal observations, in the case of culinary hearths and the like, that wherever there is smoke there is fire, having come to the conclusion, that this an invariable sequence, having reached a mountain, and having entertained a doubt about the existence of fire in it, and having observed smoke on the mountain, a man recollects the invariable and unconditional antecedence of fire, where there is smoke. Afterwards this knowledge arises in his mind that this mountain is distinguished by smoke which is invariably and unconditionally attended by fire. This is called Linga-paramarsa which means such recognition of linga or sign as leads to a logical inference. Thence is produced the knowledge, that the 'mountain is fiery.' This is called a logical inference for one's own self."

(40) "But, when any one, after having for the satisfaction of his own mind inferred fire from smoke, makes the application of the five-membered syllogistic form for the edification of the understanding of others, that inference is called the inference for the sake of others. As for instance

I. This hill is fiery.

II. Because it smokes.

III. Whatever is possessed of smoke is fiery, as a culinary hearth.

IV. And that it does so.

V. Therefore it is fiery. Thus from a sign already established, the other man also is convinced of the existence of fire."

(41) "The five-membered (Avayavas or propositions) of the syllogistic form are as follows:—
1. The proposition (pratijna that which is to be proved by argument)
2. The reason, argument or hetu;
3. The instance (udaharana, drishtanta).
4. The application (upanaya).
5. The conclusion (nigamana).

For instance;
1. 'This hill is fiery'; is the proposition.
2. 'For it smokes' is the reason or hetu.
3. 'Whatever smokes is fiery'; is the instance or udaharana.
4. 'This hill smokes'; is the application or upanaya
5. 'Therefore it is fiery'; is the conclusion or nigamana.

The modern school of the Nyaya has reduced the syllogism to three and even to two members, and this last reduction appears to have been most generally adopted. In this form the two premises, viz. major and minor propositions are condensed into one premise, of which we shall now give a description.

That a syllogism be correct, two things are required. 1, a general proposition, in which the subject (reason) is invariably connected with a predicate (conclusion), more comprehensive than the subject, and 2, a minor term with which the subject of the general proposition is connected. That there is this double connexion of the minor term with the reason, and of the reason with the conclusion, is to be decided by consideration, which is the intercourse between the minor term and the reason, as connected with the general predicate or the predicate of
the conclusion. This consideration is only one, and therefore the form of the antecedent of the conclusion can only be one, or: there is only one premise, by which the minor term is expressed as determined by the reason in its invariable connexion with the conclusion.

For instance: let a man from former observation know, that smoke is invariably connected with fire, as for instance on a culinary hearth; let him see afterwards an uninterrupted column of smoke rising from a hill, he will recollect the general proposition that smoke is invariably connected with fire. Hence the knowledge arises: This hill is possessed of smoke, which is invariably connected with fire. This knowledge, this one act, by which there is a progress from one object to a third by a second, is consideration, from which the conclusion arises: This hill is fiery.

This is in its principal points the theory of the Nyaya of the form of the syllogism. It is essentially the same with that of Aristotle. The differences are two. The first is a difference in the form, or rather in expression, viz. that the two premises are combined into one. The exposition is certainly not simple, for the different combination of the ideas, forming a syllogism, ought to be represented in their natural form, which is the connexion of two in a proposition, and the same principle ought to have been applied to the conclusion; for if it is true that two premises must be combined into one, the conclusion also should not be stated in a separate sentence, but the whole syllogism should form one sentence, for instance, in the example: This hill, determined by smoke, which is determined by fire, is determined by fire. Yet the difference is only apparent;
for the Nyaya, as Aristotle, connects, one notion with the other through a third with which the latter is connected, or excludes it by a third, from which the second is excluded.

The second difference is, that the Nyaya wanted not only to give rules for the correctness of the logical operation in arguing, but to guard against false premises, and for this purpose the consideration was also to establish the truth of the major proposition by a reference to an instance, in which the truth of the proposition was exemplified. Their consideration was therefore, not only directed to the logical operation of arguing, but also to the truth which may result from it, and both the truth of the conclusion, and the correctness of the argument should be the result of one and the same operation, which of course is impossible.

With the exposition of the form of syllogism, the logical theory of the Nayaya is nearly completed. Gautama divided inference into three kinds; 1, inference of an effect from a cause, as if rain is inferred from a collection of clouds; 2, inference of a cause from an effect, as if rain is concluded from an increase of the water in a river; and 3, inference from general notions, as if earth is inferred to be a substance from its having the quality of smell. This division, is not logical, as cause and effect are metaphysical notions and have no relation whatever to the different forms of syllogism. The modern school of the Nayaya has therefore not adopted this division, but acknowledges three kinds of syllogisms; which are only affirmative inference, only negative inference, and inference, at the same time affirmative and negative. From the examples, given
in illustration, it appears, that the latter includes two moods of the first and second figures, Barbara and Camestres; Barbara being the type for all general affirmative conclusions, and Camestres for all general negative ones. Here, however, is their theory finished and we find no trace of the different moods the syllogistical forms can enter into.

(42) "The (linga-paramarsa) or the recognition of a sign is alone the instrumental cause of an inference (anumiti), both of that for one's own self and of that for another; therefore the linga-paramarsa or the recognition of a sign is an act of inference (anumanam)."

(43) "A Sign (linga) is of three kinds, (1) that which has reference to an invariable union and separation (anwaya-vyatireki); (2) that which has reference to union alone, (kevalanwayi) and (3) that which has reference to separation alone (kevalavyatireki); Where the sign has reference to the pervading inherence (Vyapti) both by union and separation, there the sign is called that which has reference to an inseparable union and separation; as for instance, the state of being smoky, when fire is to be proved. 'Wherever there is smoke, there is fire as a culinary hearth'; this an universal affirmative. 'Where there is no fire, there can also be no smoke, as for instance the case of a great lake'; this an universal negative. The sign which has reference to union alone is that which has no negative dristanta or example, as for instance, 'this jar is nameable, because it is cognizable by prama or true
apprehension, as cloth is'. For there is no instance where a thing is unnameable when it is cognizable by true apprehension and vice versa. The sign that has a reference to separation alone, is that in regard to which we argue from an invariable absence.

As an example we institute the following syllogism:—

' (1) Earth differs from these (other elements):

' (2) Because it possesses smell:

'(3) Whatever is not different from these (other elements) is not possessed of smell, as for instance water, (ie it is not possessed of smell):

'(4) But this (earth) is not so (ie is not unpossessed of smell):

(5) Therefore it is not like the other elements.

But if (in the the third proposition) we argued (affirmatively) that 'whatever is possessed of smell is different from the other elements,' we would have been in want of an instance to cite, the earth being the singular instance of that.'

Without undergoing the needless necessity of citing an example in an argument, it can be simplified by stating a universal affirmative premise thus:—

" 1. Whatever is possessed of smell, differs from the other elements. :

(2) Earth is possessed of smell :

(3) Therefore Earth differs from other elements."
The connexion of the subject with the predicate is two-fold. Namely, there are three kinds of inference, viz; only affirmative, only negative, and affirmative and negative at the same time.

1. The only affirmative kind takes place, when there are no dissimilar instances with regard to the conclusion (major term, that is to say, when the major term is not excluded from any other notion) for instance, if it is argued, that something is an object of knowledge, because it can be named; for here is a dissimilar instance impossible as every thing is an object of knowledge.

If it is said, 'that the only affirmative kind is impossible, because it is separated from all other notions' (that is to say, such a notion is separated from all other notions, and cannot therefore be connected with all.) We deny this; for what is separated, is common to all, and this is merely affirmative. Moreover, the mere affirmation is the notion of a thing which is no object of actual absolute negation, and this is proved in the negation of the ether, &c. (that is to say, as it cannot be proved, that ether, space, &c. are not found any where, so it cannot be proved with regard to such notions as knowledge, &c.).

2. Merely negative inference takes place, when there exist no similar subjects of conclusion, for instance, in the inference: Earth is distinguished from all the other elements, because it is possessed of smell. Here is earth the minor term, the conclusion the distinction from what is different from earth, and reason the smell; for in this case there is no similar instance, viz. no instance with which the conclusion is connected, because it was before excluded from the other elements.
3. Affirmative and negative inferences take place, when there exist similar and dissimilar instances of the conclusion or major term; for instance: This is fiery, because it smokes. In this case there are similar instances, as a hearth, &c., and dissimilar instances, as a lake, &c.

The cause of the negative conclusion is the knowledge of a general negative proposition, Vyatirekavyapta. Hence the true definition of a general negative proposition is this:—A general negative is the necessity of the absence of the reason, where there is an absence of the conclusion or the major term; that is to say, a general negative is the absence of the reason, which absence is included in the absence of the conclusion or major term. Here it must be understood, by what connexion, at what place, and by what notion, the more extensive notion is comprehended, by the same connexion and notion is also the absence to be determined. From this knowledge it follows: by what connexion and notion, the more comprehensive notion is comprehended, by the same connexion and notion is also the absence to be determined. Accordingly, where the absence of smell expresses the notion of the other elements by distinctive relation, there follows the absolute negation of the notion of the other elements by the negation of the negation of smell; but where the more extensive notion of the other elements is comprehended by the relation of identity; this is reciprocal negation. And lastly, when by the relation of conjunction, for instance, the more extensive notion of fire with regard to smoke is comprehended, there the negation of smoke, determined by the relation of conjunction, in a tank
also follows from the negation of fire, determined by the relation of conjunction. Here is the cause of the apprehension of the general negative proposition, the knowledge of what agrees with a general negative.

Another opinion on the subject is that: By means of the negative, the general affirmative is understood, but the knowledge of the general negative proposition, is not the cause. Where by means of the general negative, the general proposition is understood, thereof it is called a negative inference. The necessity of the conclusion (major term, here the difference from the other elements) is first evident from single things, as a jar, &c. and afterwards it is established for the notion of earth, &c.

(44) "That, where the existence of the property to be proved is doubtful, is called the subject of the conclusion (paksha); as the mountain, when the fact of its having possessed of smoke is the reason (argument or hetu). That, where the existence of the property to be proved is undoubted, is called the subject on the same side or Sapaksha; as the culinery hearth, in the same argument. That which is undoubted possessed of the negation of the property to be proved, is called the subject in opposition or vipaksha; as a great lake in the same argument."

OF FALLACIES.

(45) "There are five semblances of reason or fallacies or hetwabhasas, which are as follows:—

I. Going astray.
II. Contradiction."
III. Equalization.
IV. Inconclusiveness.
V. Absurdity."

(46) "The fallacy of going astray or sayabhidhara is that which may have a conclusion different from that which is wanted.

It is of three kinds.

1. That which is too general or Sadharana.

2. That which is not general enough or asadharana.

3. And that which is non-exclusive or anupasannahari.

The fallacy of going astray, which is too general, is that where the reason or hetu may be present, when the property to be proved is absent; as for example, if one would say, 'The mountain is fiery, because it is cognizable by prama or true apprehension but cognizability by prama or true apprehension can as well be ascribed to a lake which is possessed of the negation of fire.'

(47) "The fallacy of going astray that is not general enough, is excluded from the subject of conclusion and from an opposite one. As for example, 'sound is eternal, because it is possessed of the generic property of sound.' This is a fallacy of going astray that is not general enough, for the generic property of sound exists in sound alone and excluded from all, either eternal or non-eternal.'

(47) "The fallacy of going astray that is non-exclusive or anupasannahari, where no example can
be brought either in support or in opposition. As for instance, if it is said, that 'Every thing is non-eternal, because it is cognizable by prama knowledge without error,'—here there is no example to cite, because 'every thing' is the subject of the conclusion.'

(48) "The fallacy of contradiction or virudha is that, where the reason is invariably attended with the negation of what is to be proved. As for example, when it is said that,—'sound is eternal because it is created.' This argument should be rejected as fallacious, because the state of having been created is attended with non-eternity:— the negation of eternity."

(49) "It is called the fallacy of equalization or satpratipaksha when the reason is counterbalanced by another reason which proves the negation of what is to be proved. As for example, when one would say that, 'The sound is eternal, because it is cognizable by the organ of hearing, as the generic property of sound is acknowledged by both parties,' it might be said with equal force on the other side, that, 'sound is non-eternal, because it is a creation, as a jar is.'

(50) "The fallacy of inconclusiveness, is of three kinds:—

1. inconclusiveness on the part of the subject arayasiddha;

2. inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason swarupasidha;
3. inconclusiveness from limitation." (vyapya-twasiddha)

(51) "As an example of the inconclusiveness on the part of the subject it is cited, ‘The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is possessed of the generic property of lotuses, as in the lotuses of the lake, here the sky-lotus is the locality of the generic property of a lotus, which sky-lotus is in reality nonexistent.’"

(52) "Inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason takes place, for instance, when it is inferred ‘that sound is a quality, because it is cognizable by the organ of sight.’ But this cognizability by the organ of sight is not existent in the sound; sound being cognizable by the organ of hearing. Inconclusiveness from limitation would take place, for instance, when the reason is attended with an indispensable condition. Such an indispensable condition or upadhi is what always attends the property to be proved, but does not always attend what is brought forward as a proof.”

(53) "Invariable attendance on the object to be proved (sadhya-vyapakatwa) consists in the not being the counterpart (apratiyogita) of the absolute negation (atyantabhava) attendant on (samanadhikarana) that which is to be proved. Non-invariable attendance on that which is cited as a proof (sadhana-vyapakatwa) consists in the being th counterpart (pratiyogita) of the negation which exists in the proof.”
(54) "In the argument that, 'The mountain is possessed of smoke, because it has fire,' here the contact of wet fuel is an indispensable condition. As for instance, 'wherever there is smoke there is the union with wet fuel,' is an invariable attendance on what is to be proved (sadhyavyapakata). But such an inference is not true, 'That wherever there is fire, there is the union with wet fuel' for there is no union with wet fuel in the case of an ignited iron ball—this is what is called the non-invariable attendance on the proof or sadhana-vayapakata. Thus the invariable attendance on what is [to be proved being coexistent with the non-invariable attendance on the proof, the indispensable condition there is the union with wet fuel. As this additional condition is indispensable here, to prove the absolute presence of smoke, fieriness in this argument is fallacious as regards its conclusiveness."

Such an argument as expressed in the form, 'The mountain is fiery:—therefore it must have smoke,' is called an Enthyememe, because here of the two premises of a regular syllogism only one is expressed and the other is suppressed in the mind (en thymo) of the speaker. When a fallacy occurs in an Enthyememe, it is very difficult to detect whether the fallacy is in the reasoning or it is a fallacy extra dictionem.

(55) "The fallacy of absurdity or badhita, is that where the negation of what is to be proved is established without doubt by another proof. If for example, one would say that, 'Fire is cold,
because it is a substance.' Here the predicate of the conclusion, what is to be proved, is coldness, the negation of which, warmth, is apprehended by the organ of touch by one's own self. Hence the argument is called absurd."

"Thus ends the chapter on Inference."

Too general is a reason, which abides as well in the subject of the conclusion as in an opposite one; subject of the conclusion (sapaksha) is, where the major term abides, for instance, if fire is the major, smoke the middle, a mountain or a hearth is the subject or the minor &c. A "subject opposite to the conclusion (Vipaksha) is, where it does not abide; for instance, in the example given above, a tank is a subject, opposite to the conclusion or the major term,

That is to say, the reason is too general, when it abides also in a subject, where the major term is not found. For instance, let a hearth be the subject or minor term; smoke the major term, and fire the reason, the conclusion would be: the hearth smokes, because it is fiery, which would be false, because it is too general; for fire, the reason, is also connected with other subjects, where there is no smoke, for instance, with an ignited iron ball.

This is not a logical fallacy, which takes place, when the conclusion does not follow from the premises but as a fallacy extra dictionem, where the matter of the premises is wrong; for the conclusion follows here from the premises. In this instance the major proposition is wrong, which is: wherever there is fire there is smoke. The conclusion, however, is quite
right as well in form as in matter, and the example is therefore not judiciously selected. The fault would, however be apparent, if iron ball for instance had been taken for the minor term.

Non-general is the reason, which has no similar subjects of conclusion for the major term, that is where the major term has only one subject, or where no similar instances can be adduced for the reason.

Non-exclusive, is a reason, where the major term is the negation of absolute negation i.e. where the major term may be predicated of any other notion. Hereby a general negative is impossible and a conclusion therefore cannot take place.

A contradictory reason is one which does not abide in the subject of conclusion or minor term, that is to say, a reason, whose negation is the major term or reason which is the contrary notion of the major term. Be cow the subject, the notion (class) of cow the major, and the notion of horse the middle term. Here the reason, the notion of the horse, excludes the major, the notion of cow, and therefore does not admit of an inference. Here the fault is in the reasoning, but the major premise is wrong; it is therefore a fallacy extra dictionem.

1. Inconclusiveness on the part of the subject is there, where the notion of the subject or the minor term, is impossible

For instance, if it should be inferred, that a golden-hill is fiery, the conclusion could not take place, because there is no such thing as a golden hill.

Here also the conclusion is not wrong; the fault lies in the minor premise, where the subject is a notion, not
given by experience; and the fallacy is therefore one *extra dictionem*.

2. Inconclusiveness from the nature of the reason or the middle term, takes place, if the reason is not found in the subject, with which a connexion was supposed if the reason and the subject exclude each other. Let it for instance be argued that a tank is a thing, because, it smokes. Tank or water in the tank, and smoke are contrary notions, and smoke therefore cannot be predicated of a tank.

Here also lies the fallacy in the minor premise. We observe, that the second kind of inconclusiveness does not correspond to the first. In the first the minor term, was contradictory, and we should therefore have expected, that in the second the reason would have been contradictory.

3. Inconclusiveness from limitation on the part of the invariable connexion with the predicate. This can be two-fold, on the part of the suject, and on the part of the predicate.

a. On the part of the predicate. This takes place if the predicate is a contradictory notion. For instance, if the inference were made, that the mountain has a golden fire, the notion of a golden fire, major term is contradictory.

Here the major premise is wrong,

b. Secondly on the part of the reason. This takes place, if the reason is contradictory, for instance, if the argument were 'the mountain is fiery from golden smoke.' The fault is here again in the major premise.
Some say, that this kind takes place, if the terms are too narrow, as if it should be inferred that the mountain is fiery, because it has blue smoke.

IV. An equalised reason is the consideration of opposite reasons. An equalised reason takes place, if at the time of the consideration of a reason, invariably connected with the absence of the conclusion or the major term the consideration of a reason occurs with which the conclusion is invariably connected; as for instance, if at the time of consideration of water, &c. which is invariably connected with the absence of fire, there is a consideration of smoke invariably connected with fire.

V. Absurdity is, if a subject is without the conclusion, which is assigned to it.

Absurdity takes place, if the conclusion does not abide in the subject or minor term; for instance, if at the time of the production of a jar, the jar is taken as the subject or minor term, and smell as the conclusion, there is an absurdity, because at the time of production there is no smell in a jar, &c. for all things are at that time without smell.

**COMPARISON.**

(56) "Comparison (upamaïna) is the instrumental cause of the act of comparing (two or more things with one another from similarity). The act of comparing is the knowledge of the relation which exists between a name and a thing named. The cause of this is a knowledge of similarity. The recollection of the extension of the signification of a word by analogy is a step involved in the operation. As for instance a man not knowing what is signified by
the word *gavaya* (Bos gavaeus), and having heard from a forest-man that 'a *gavaya* is like a cow' resorts to a forest, where having recollected the meaning of the sentence told to him, he sees a body like that of a cow. Then arises this act of comparison in his mind, that, 'this is what is meant by the word *gavaya*.'

"Thus has comparison been explained."

The author then goes on to the chapter on Testimony.

**TESTIMONY.**

(57) "A word is an assertion by one worthy of trust. He is but called worthy of trust, who speaks the truth. A sentence is a collection of significant sounds; as for instance, 'Bring the cow.' A significant sound or *pada* is that which has the power to convey a certain meaning. 'This meaning is to be understood from this significant sound' is the will of God, which is called the convention or the power."

(58) "Mutual correspondence, compatibility, and juxtaposition of the words are (unitedly) the cause of the knowledge of the significance of a sentence."

These three requisites are elucidated below.

(59) "The reverse of a tendency to convey any other than the intended connexion of one word with another, is what is called the mutual correspondence (*akanksha*). Compatability (*yogyata*) is nothing more than the non-futility of the signification of a sen-
sentences. Juxtaposition (sannidhi) is the pronunciation of words without long pause (between each).

The want of the three requisites enumerated above are exemplified below.

(60) "A sentence or a collection of words wanting in mutual correspondence, &c., is no valid sentence— for instance, 'cow, horse, man, elephant,' gives no proof, there being no mutual reference between the words."

Akanksa literally means desiring for, or looking after something. In the sentence: 'Dittha chadram pasyati,' or 'Dittha (an individual) sees the moon,' here the word 'Dittha' being in the nominative case, wants a verb to regulate, which it finds in the word 'pasyati.' Again the verb 'pasyati' requires an action to govern which it finds in the word 'chandram,' similarly the word 'chandram' requires a nominative and a verb which it finds in 'Dittha' and 'pasyati.' Thus there is a mutual correspondence between the three words, 'Dittha,' 'chandram,' and 'pasyati.' The author then goes on to show that mutual correspondence alone is not sufficient to make a sentence valid.

As for instance:

(61) "The sentence 'He should irrigate with fire' is not valid, as it is in want of compatibility (there being no such thing between fire and irrigation, water alone being compatible with irrigation.)"

This is an instance where though there is no want of mutual correspondence or akanksa, yet the sentence is not valid as there is no compatibility or yogyata between fire and irrigation. The Author then shows how a sentence may not be valid, though it may be complete as
regards mutual correspondence and compatibility, if it is in want of the juxtaposition of the words in it.

(62) "Words pronounced not close together but at intervals of praharas (or two and half hours of the solar day), such as 'Bring—the—cow' &c. form no valid sentences, as there is a want of the juxtaposition of the words."

This is an instance of the invalidity of a sentence owing to the absence of juxtaposition of the words constituting it, though it is valid as regards its mutual correspondence and compatibility.

(63) "Speech is of two kinds, divine (vaidika), and human (laukika). What is called vaidika or divine is authoritative as it is uttered by God. But human or laukika speech, that is uttered by one who deserves confidence, is alone authoritative; other is not so."

(64) "The knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is verbal knowledge (sabdabodha). Its special cause is (the knowledge of) words. Thus is ascertained what is called True Apprehension."

**FALSE APPREHENSION.**

(65) False apprehension is of three kinds, through the division of doubt, mistake, and the fault of reductio ad absurdum."

(66) "The recognition, in a thing possessing a certain quality, of many contradictory qualities as characterising it, is doubt or Sansaya. For instance 'whether a post or a man.'"
Darkness or insufficient light is the cause of this doubt. When we do not come to a resolution, whether this is not a post, or this is not a man, and we confound the qualities of both in it, it is then called doubt.

(67) "False knowledge is mistake or viparyaya. For instance, the knowledge of silver in a pearl-shell."

(68) "Reductio ad absurdum or tarka is that which consists in founding the pervader (here supposed to be denied) through the allegation of the pervaded (here supposed to be taken for granted). As for instance, 'If there were not fire (which you do not grant), then there would not be smoke (which you admit there is)."

(69) "Memory is also two-fold, true and false. True memory is that which arises from true apprehension. False memory is that which arises from false apprehension."

The author having exhausted the subject of Intellect, hurries on to the remaining qualities of pleasure, pain, &c.

(70) "That is called pleasure or sukham which is agreeable to the perception of all; likewise that is called pain or dukham which is disagreeable (to the perception of all)."

(71) "Desire or ichcha means wishing. Aversion or dwesha means wishing-ill-of. Effort (prayatna) means action."

(72) "Virtue or merit (dharma) arises from the performance of what is enjoined; but what is called vice or demerit (adharma) is that which arises from the perpetration of what is prohibited."
(73) "The eight qualities, commencing from intellect, are the specific qualities of soul alone."

(74) "Intellect, desire, and effort, are of two kinds eternal and non-eternal or transient. These are eternal when they belong to God, and non-eternal or transient when they appertain to mortals."

(75) "Faculty is of three kinds, velocity, thought, and elasticity. Velocity or vega abides in the four substances beginning with Earth and in mind. Thought or bhavana which arises from perception and is the cause of memory, exists in soul alone. Elasticity or sthitisthapaka is the restorer to former position, of a thing whose position has been changed, and is a quality that abides in mats and such other substances formed of earthly elements."

"Thus ends the chapter on the Qualities."

The author then goes on to the category of Action.

ACTION.

(76) "Action consists in motion."

Casting upward or utkshepana is the cause of a contact with the higher region. Casting downwards or apakshepana is the cause of contact with a lower region. Contraction or akunchana is the cause of the close contact with what is near to the body. Dilation or prasarana is the cause of the close contact with what is distant. Every thing else is called going or gamana. Action exists in the four substances beginning from the earth and in the mind."

The author then proceeds to the category of genus or generality.
GENUS OR GENERALITY.

(77) "Genus or Genrality (samanya) is eternal, one and belonging to many, and abiding in Substance, Quality, and Action. It is two-fold, higher and lower. The highest degree of genus or generality or the Sumnum genus is existence. The lower degree is called the species or jati, such as is substantiability or the common nature of what are called substances."

Of the two para and apara, para is that which is more extensive and therefore is called the Genus; and apara is less extensive and therefore is called the species.

The author then goes on to the category of Particularity.

PARTICULARITY.

(78) "Particularities or viseshas are existent in, eternal substances and are such that they exclude (the eternal substances) from each other."

Eternal substances are 1. mind, 2 soul, 3 time, 4 space 5 ether; and 6 the atoms of earth, water, and air. Then comes the category of Intimate Relation.

INTIMATE RELATION.

(79) "Intimate relation or samavaya is eternal connexion. It abides in things which can not exist separately. Two things which can not exist separately are those, of which two, one exists as absorbed in the other. Such pairs are, parts and whole composed of those parts, qualities and the thing qualified, action and actor, species and individual, particularity and eternal substances."
At last the author comes to the last of the categories, namely negation or non-existence.

**NEGATION.**

(80) “It is of various sorts. Antecedent negation or pragabhava is without beginning, but has a termination. Such is the negation of an action before it is produced. Destruction or pradhvansa has a beginning, but no termination. Such is the negation of an action subsequent to its production. Absolute negation or atyantabhava is the counterpart of what is distinguished by union during the three times past, present and future. As for example, ‘There is no jar on the ground.’ Mutual negation or anyonyabhava is the counterpart of what is distinguished by union with identity. As for instance, ‘A jar cannot be cloth.’

(81) “Since every thing is included under the categories enumerated, categories are therefore ascertained to be seven alone.”

The author concludes with the following couplet:—

(82) “These logical and philosophical aphorisms were composed by the learned Anna Bhatta, in order to clear the understanding of juvenile students as regards the opinions of Kanada and of Nayaya.”

Gotama is the founder of nyaya or logic; and kanada is the founder of the system of philosophy called vaiseshika.

“Thus is the Traka Sangraha finished.”
नर्कसंघः

१। निधाय उद्दि विषेषं निधाय गुरुवदनम्।
बाचानां सूखेरोधाय क्रियते नर्कसंघः॥

२। द्रव्यगुणकर्मासामान्यविशेषसमवायाभावाः
स्मारपदार्था:॥

३। तच्च द्रव्याणि प्रत्यथीमेव चाम्बाकाशका
खंदिगात्रमानांसि नवैव।

४। इपरमसमस्यविषयसक्षारपिंमाणपूर्वकस्य
योगविभागपरत्वापरतंगुणस्तःवलिपिधान्तः
बुद्धिसुखदुःखच्छक्कादिश्रवयत्रमेवसंख्यातस्य
तृतीयश्विषगुणाँ॥

५। नल्लेपणायाचेष्टाकुशनप्रसारस्थगमनानि
प्रसैव कर्माणि।

६। परमपरश्चति दिविध सामान्यम्।
नियत्रक्षत्तायो विशेषााक्ष्ममा है॥
सन्मवायमप्रक एव।
सन्मवायससत्विन्धः प्रागभावः प्रभवं साभाविकं-स्वाभाविकं नियोगं आभाविकेन।
तत् गम्भरति प्राथ्यपि सा दिविधा निया सन्नियाचैति निया परमाणुचिता। अनिवा कार्यं रूपं। सा पुनःसिद्धिविधा शरीरित्रियविषयमेधान। शरीरमन्दद्वींतान्मक्क्षिणं दशः गन्धांकं अग्निः तत् नासायच् वर्षिकं विषयं निम्बाधार्यान्ति।
श्च शीतस्वत्वभन्तेव भापं।
तास्ख दिविधा निया अनिवास। निया पर-माणुरूपम्। अनिवा कार्यरूपम्। ताः पुनः-सिद्धिविधा। शरीरित्रियविषयमेधान। शरीरं वहुमेचरे। दशः रक्षयाणं रचनं तत्त्व-जिञ्हायवर्षि। विषयं सरितसदुद्राधि।
विषयं सरितसदुद्राधि।
उद्वस्वशृङ्खलेः। तद्विधं निम्बमनिलयम्। नियं परमाणुरूपम्। अनितं कार्यरूपम्। पुनःसिद्धिविधं। शरीरित्रियविषयमेधान। शरीर-मार्दित्यवृक्षं क्रियम्। दशः मल्लुरूपथाचं चचलं। तत्त्वं कृष्णायताराम्यवर्षि। विषयं सृष्टिविधं। भौम-मिर्द्धादर्याकरविशदृश्। भौमं वक्रादिक।
तत्कथायां ।

अस्विन्नं दिन्यं विदुहुः राज। भूत्तस्य परिषा-मधुतुरौद्रयम्। चाकरजं दुर्वाणादि।

११। दुर्प्रभुविषयेऽवायुः। व दिविषेण निन्द्वाधिनित्यः। नित्यः परमाणुद्वप्तिनित्यः। याय-रुपः। नुनिन्द्विविषं श्रीरित्रिकविषयवेदान्त।

श्रीरेण वायुवेक्रे। इद्धित्य या गोपकां लक्ष्मण शर्मेशर्मेन विषयं। विषयो उच्चादिकमण्डलेनु

१२। श्रीरातनः सत्यारी वायुः। प्राणः सचेत्तो गुणापदिहेतायाः। पानाहिरं रंगं बभति।

१३। बन्धुमुखांकशं सचेत्तो विभुः। नित्यः। अतितां द्वितीयत्र चतुर्दशे। काष्ठं सचेत्तो विभुः।

१४। प्रायादिविश्वार्थस्तुतितिकः सचेत्ता नित्या विभुः।

१५। ज्ञानाधिकरणमात्र। व दिविषयो जी-वाता परमात्मान। तनेश्वरः सर्वनः परमात्मा।

एक एवं चुंबुक्तेदारिचितः। जीवात्मा।

१६। चुंबुक्तेश्वरः अवस्यपूज्यसाधनमितियं मनः।
ঐ প্রথমালক্ষ্যনিয়ন্ত্রণাধীনা পরমাণুধর্ম নিয়ন্ত্রণ।

১৩। অথ গুণা:।
চন্দ্রমোচনেত্রা গুণে প্রপঞ্চ। তথা যুগলেহ পীতরক্তচরিতকমলিতচিরগুলো প্রথী-কীীজনস্মৃতি।। তত্ত্ব প্রথিযায়া সমধিকম। অপার্থ মুঘন জলে। মাসারূ মহু নে- জলি।

১৮। রসনঘাট্টী গুণে রসঃ সচ মধুরাচার- বর্ণকটকরায়ানন্ত্রা মেতান্ত্রা। বধিক্ষ: প্রথিযাইক- সৃষ্টি।। প্রথিযায়া বধিক্ষ: জলে মধুর এবং।

২০। লরিন্দ্রমোচনেত্রা গুণ: বর্ণ।। সচ বধিক্ষ: শীতাচারাণ্যায়ানন্ত্রান্ত্রা প্রথিযাইক- সৃষ্টি।। তত্ত্ব শীতা জলে। তালাদিকক্ষ। অনুভাবনীও: প্রথিযাইকেঃ।

২১। ইপাদিততুষ্ট্য প্রথিযায়া পাকজামনিন্ত্রা। অনুচাপারকর্ম নিয়ন্ত্রিত্বম। নিয়ন্ত্রন নি- কলম।। অনিলয়গতমনিন্ত্র।


२२। एकाधिवधारासाधारण चेतुसंख्या ।
वा नवदुर्व्यञ्जिः। एकाधिपराभव्यञ्जिः।
एकस्तुलिंबस्य मिनित्यं नित्यगनयित्यमनित्य-मग्नित्यस्म। दिव्यादिकन्तु सर्वेणा नित्यमेव।
२३। मानवधारासाधारण कारण परिमाणं नवदुर्व्यञ्जिः। तत्र चतुर्विंशं अणु शममूद्रे
दीर्घं द्वृक्ष्येऽति।
२४। प्रथगमधारासाधारणं कारणं प्रथं त्रिबं
सर्वदुर्व्यञ्जिः।
२५। संयुक्तधारासाधारणं केवलं संयोगः
सर्वदुर्व्यञ्जिः।
२६। संयोगनाकेकृत्य गुणो विभागः सर्वदुर्व्य-
ञ्जिः।

परापरंधारासाधारणकारणे परताप-
रक्षे। प्रथ्रियाणि चतुष्ठयमनोव्यञ्जिनः ते दिविधे
दीर्घे कालंलं । दूरस्य दीक्षा-मपरम
सुमीपं दीक्षा-मपरम्। ज्ञेषु कालकतम
परमे कनिष्ठे कालकतमपरम्।
२७। वाचपतनाशस्मवाच्यकारणं गुह्यं प्रथि-व्रीजञञ्जिः।
२८। अत्राश्वनाबमादवायिकायां द्रवलं पुष्टि-
प्रेतेतावृत्ति। नातिविधं सांस्कृतिकं नैमिनि-
कर्म। सांस्कृतिकं जाने। नैमिनि कं प्रयिकी-
नेवसोऽ। पृथ्वियां घृतादृशः अग्रिसङ्गोऽगजन्वं
द्रवलम्।
२९। चूर्णादिपिप्पलीभावचितुरुगुः बैलसा अज
माचवतः।
३०। अत्रास्वाच्छा गुणःशब्द अत्राश्वमाचवतः।
अति विधिष्ठान्तरको वर्णात्मकस्वति। अवनादा-
ताको सर्वः। वर्णात्मकः संस्कृतमभाषार्थि-
रूपः।
३१। सर्वव्यवहारचितुवुंदियकः नामस।
सा दिविधा सूतिरनन्दवस्ख।
संस्कारमाचन्यं श्वानं सृतिः। निष्क्रियं श्वान-
मनुभवं। स दिविधी यथायां यथायथसः।
३२। तदवति नत्रकाराकादुभवो यथायः यथा
रजने इद्दं रजतमिनि श्वानस। सैव प्रमेयवु-
चने। तदभवति नत्रकाराको उनमेवा
यथायः। यथा पुतङ्कादिदं रजतमिनयादि
श्वानस।
रत्नकंद: ।

१४। यथार्थानुभवम्बृतविधं प्रत्यक्षानुमित्तविनि- 
मित्रानानं अयं भेदतात्। नक्षरवस्तुः चतुर्विधं 
प्रत्यक्षानुमानानी अपानानं भेदतात्।

१५। व्यापारवद्धाधारणं कारणं करणम्। 
अनुस्यत्सिद्ध कार्यनियन्तपूर्ववतः: कारणम। 
कार्यं प्रागभावप्रनियोऽग।

१६। कारणं चित्रिधं समाब्यांसमवायिनिमित्त- 
भेदात्। यथाऽवेतं कार्यमुखदत्तते तत्समवायि 
कारणं यथा तन्नमं पतखं परखं खगन्दीपाद्धः। 
कार्यं चारणेन वा चवैमिकिवभिः सम- 
वेतले सति कारणम्। असमवायि कारणं यथा 
तन्नमं ग्रंथं पतखं तन्नमं ग्रंथं पतखपस्य। 
तदृ- 
भविभिः कारणं निमित्तकारणं यथा तुरीरि- 
मादिकं पतखं। तद्दैतचित्रिधकारणसभ्यं यथ- 
वाधारणं कारणं तदुपूर्व कारणम।

१६। तत्र प्रत्यक्षानकरणं प्रत्यक्षम्। इत्यत्त्वार्थ- 
सिद्धितं सत्त्वं चानं प्रत्यक्षम्। 
तन्न द्विविधं निर- 
विकष्णं सिद्धविकषकस्त। तत्र निखर्यं चारं 
सत्तं निर्विकषककस्त। यथा इत्यदृश्ये किष्ट्टु। स-
प्रकारकं चानं सविक्रमकम्। यथा डिवी-शयम्। वामण्डा तमम्। त्यामही नणमित।

१७। प्रयच्छन्नष्टतिरित्यायसंविकर्ष: पवंति।
संयोगं समवायं समवेतसमवायं समवायं समवेतसमवायं विशेषाविशेषाभावा रूपम्।
चहुं घटप्रत्यक्षांने संयोगं सचिकर्ष: घटप्रत्यक्षांजने संयोगं सचिकर्ष:।
चहुं संयुक्ते घटे रूपस्य समवायान।
संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायं सचिकर्ष:।
चहुं संयुक्ते घटे रूपं समवेतं नत्र रूपस्य समवायान।
श्रीपच्छ श्रवणचालकारं समवायं सचिकर्ष:।
कर्णविवर्तरथाकायकाः श्रीचतवान् श्रवणाचारकाशाकुमाराणां गुणांगुणोदेशं समवायान।
श्रवणसाकालकारं समवेतसमवायं सचिकर्ष:।
श्रीचतसंवेते श्रवणांश्रवस्य समवायान।
भावावः विशेषाविशेषाभावं सचिकर्ष:।
घटप्रत्यक्षां भावावः विशेषाभावं सध्यान्यं
एवं सचिकर्ष: न्यं।
तद्वां कामाम्। तत्कारणं दक्षिणं तक्षादिशिंनं प्रवत्तप्रभाबांशमिति सिद्धम्।

७८। अनुमितिकारणसमुन्मानम्। परामशेजनाय शानसनुमिति। आप्रविशिष्टपच्चमंत्रायामाण्ये परामशेष। यथा विज्ञावयूषवानः पर्वत दृश्ये शानं परामशेष। समायं पर्वते। विद्मात्रिनि शानम्। अनुमिति। यथा यत्र धूमस्त्राधिरिति साधवर्यायनमेऽवाप्नि। व्यायक्त पर्वतादिशुद्धिः पच्चमेत।

७८। अनुमाणं दिविष्यं खायं परायंक्ष। खायेः खासुमितिशितु। नत्यां। खास्मेव भ्रम्यं भृत्रो दुर्गेनेन यत्र यत्र धूमस्त्राधिरिति मद्यान्। नकारे वाप्नि युष्माला पर्वतेयं में गला तद्वपि चार्य। सत्वाचार्यं पर्वते धूमं पवयाम्। व्याप्तं कारति यत्र धूमस्त्राधिरिति। नद्या-नारे विज्ञावयूषवानः अर्थं पर्वतं दृश्ये शान-मुयात्याने। आप्नेमेव विद्मा परामशेष दृश्ये नान। तत्कारणं विद्मात्रिनि शानमनुमितिष्ठिन-धाने। तद्भन्तवायायानुमानम्।

४०। यत्रं लघुं धूमदण्डिमनुमानयं परस्परं विद्मात्र-
शिनं पञ्जायवववांग प्रयुक्ते तत्त्वराधानुमानम्।
यथा पर्वते वक्ष्मान् धूमवच्चाल्। ये येन
धूमवाद्व वक्ष्मान् यथा साधनसः। तथा-
चारसः। तृतादेशः। अनेन प्रतिपादिता-
विन्ध्यायो ग्रंथं प्रतिष्ठाने।

४१। प्रतिष्ठादेश द्राक्षररोपणयनिगमवचनि पञ्जायवशः। पर्वते वक्ष्मानिनिप्रतिष्ठा। धूम-
वच्चालिति चेतुः। ये येन धूमवच्चालितयुदाहर-
णम्। तथाचायमिलुपनम्। नक्षात्मेन्ति
निगमवः।

४२। क्षायंनुमतिपरायानुमितविर्धरकरमश्रमः
रय करणं तस्यायिनः करामश्रमः नुमानम्।
४२। चिदः चिविध अनवयवत्तरिके। केवलवक्षः
केवलवत्तरिकैः चेति। अनवयेन वयवत्तरिकेष स
वयंवसेनवत्तरिकैः यथा चन्द्रोऽस्मि धूम-
वच्चालम्। यत धूमवच्चालितयथा सचानस दुर्यस्म-
यानि:। यत वक्ष्मानक्षि तत धूमव त्पि नास्ति
यथा चाहृद इति वयवत्तरिकैः। अनवयव-
मात्वयानिकः केवलवक्षः यथा घटोऽपि विभिन्ने:
प्रभुवलाच पदवन्। अन्त्र प्रभुवलाचित्रत्वतुः हः।
तिरेक्ष्याय्यांत्यक चर्चा व्रतात्मार्दिष्यान्तुच्यः । वयंतिरेक्ष्याय्यांत्यक केवलक्षणरीकः ।
यथा प्रविठीतरेभ्यो भिषयते गम्भीरवताः । यद्यति-
तरेभ्यो न भिषयते न तड़क्यवत् यथा ज्ञभः ।
न चार्यं तथा । तथा नान्तरत्यां । अज यज्ञवंत-
दितरभिज्ञामितः इहऽतो नाति प्रिथ्वी
मानयं पच्चत्वात् ।

d)
सत्वरिग्नसाध्यायान्यः । यथा धूमवन्तै चेतो
धर्मः । नियमितसाध्यायान्या सप्तः । यथा
तदेव मध्यान्यः । नियमितसाध्याभावान्यान्या
विपचः । यथा तदेव मध्यान्यः ।

d)
सुधिकारविशेषस्तत्ततासाध्याबिधितां
पञ्चेन्नुभाषाः ।

d)
सत्त्विशारे नैकालिकः । सत्त्विशारः सा-
धारणासाधारणाः नपंसादरियुष्टाः । तत् सा-
धाराभववृत्तिः साधारणो नैकालिकः । यथा
पर्यते वक्ष्मान् प्रमियतादिति प्रमियत्वश्च
वत्ततिः पर्यते विचमानवताः ।

d)
सवर्गापविचारविशेषसाधारणः । यथा
शब्दः नित्यः प्रक्षमादिति शब्दः सवर्गाः ।
নিবেদিতা নিলেমশ্য অৰ্থাৎ শব্দান্তরিতি।
অন্যর্থে রাজারঃ ত্বকপুরচ্ছারো যথা
সর্বমন্ত্রঃ প্রমেয়লাভপতি। চতুর্থ সর্বমানাপি
পচলাত  এক্ষত্বা নাভিঃ।

d। সাথুভাবায়ো চেতুবিহবা। যথা শব্দঃ
নির্দেশঃ কঠোলাভপতি। কঠোলাভাতি নিখ্যাঁ-
ধার্মিক নিলেন  আল্লাম।

d। সাথুভাবাথাধকঃ চেলনারঃ যথাঃসমনি-
পতঃ। যথা শব্দঃ নির্দেশঃ আবণলাত শব্দকঠো-
লাভপতি। শব্দকঠোলাভাতি কার্তিকান্তঃ ঘটবতদিঃ।

d৫০। চেতুবিহবা। অস্মাদিকাদিঃ শাখ্মপার-
সিভেলা আল্লামাবিহবদিঃ।

d৫১০। অস্মাদিকাদিঃ যথা গগনার্বিকীর্তি সুমিত
আবণলাত। সর্দোজারবিন্দবং । চতুর্থ
গগনার্বিকীর্তমাস্ত্রঃ সচ নাভো

d৫২০। শাখ্মপারসিদিঃ যথা শব্দঃ গৃহস্থানাঙ্গনান।
চতুর্থ চালুকপুরচ্ছারো নাধিঃ শব্দে আবণনান্ত।
সাধসাথাবিহীনঃ চেতুবিহারাসিদিঃ। সাথুভাবায়-
কলে তথি সাধনাযাপক উপাধি।

d৫৩। সাথুভাবায়োধিকরাঙ্গালাভায়পতীশ্বা-
गिब्जः साह्यापकाल्मु। काश्यन्नविकायला-भवप्रिनिर्मितिं वाजनाच्यापकाल्मु।

पू४। पवेत्री पूमवानु बिक्षलवाण्डिरश्वरादृश्यनसंशया दच्छिन्धिः। तथापि यथा पूम-लखणादृश्यनसंशया दच्छिन्धायापकतम्। वत्स बिक्षलवाण्डिरसंशया नाति भयोगीः त्वेति आदृश्यनसंशयागामात्रादिति काश्याच्यापकतम्।

यथा काश्यापकतमु वति काश्यनाच्यापकतवादा-दृश्यनसंशयाग उपाधिः। सेवाधिकलादिकाम्रत्रां बाह्यूपाणिः।

पू४। यथा साह्याभावः प्रमाणामकर्षण निभितः स वाधितः। यथा बिक्षलवाण्डिरुक्तीलादिति। अन्वानुप्रालं साह्यं नद्भावं त-आङ्ग्रेजङ्ग मलिनः प्रत्येकः रूढि विदति बाधिनलम्।

वायूः नात्तीवायात्मनुकुमानम्॥

पू५। उपमिनिकरणापमानसम्। संसाध्यलिकृत-समभाषापमानमितिः। तत्करणं साह्यकाल-सम्। अन्तर्वेदकार्यकारिणमवाचनराधा-पारः। तथापि गृहवधकाच्यामजानन कुम्-खिदारणकपुष्पाद्वं सदे। गवयो देहि।
शुल्कां वनं गतो बाक्यांं सरन्धूलाजसबिंधु पमालं तदन्मस्तं असो गच्छेश्वराचविषये प्रमिनिकृतत्वविदानि। व्याख्यातमुपमानम्॥
पूर । आपावाक्यं शब्दं। आपस्त वयायचित्रम्।
वाक्यं पदसमूहं। यथा गामानयों। शसं पदम।
अस्मान्यद्वृजपरी वेष्णमध्य रति
ईत्यर्धें संकेतं शक्ति।।
पूर । आकाशं योगयता संबिधिलं बाक्यांचे
स्मानेश्वत॥
पूर । पद्यम पदान्तरव्यतिरिक्तमुखार्य
नमुभाषकलमाकाशं। अर्धावधीं योगयता
पद्यमाबिशिष्टेनाचारणं संबिधि।।
००। आकाशान्दिरहिं वाक्यप्रमाणं यथा
चौरश्रःयुक्ते। हस्तीति न प्रमाणमाकाशाविर-
चाल॥
०१। अथिना स्वभव्यति न प्रमाणं योगयता-
विरचाल॥
०२। प्रचरे प्रचरे चर्चेउपातितानि गामा-
नवेद्यादिपदानं न प्रमाणं साक्षियाभावात्॥
०३। वाक्यं दिविधं बैदिकं लैकिकक्ष कैदी-
কামীকরী শালীরগোলে গঠিতম। কোনীকল্পনা শালীপ্রতীতমার্গম। অধিকল্পনা শালীপ্রতীতমার্গম।

৭৪। ব্যাখ্যাতাক্ষরে মাধ্যমে নক্ষত্রাদি শব্দ।

dতি প্রয়োগানুভবের নিকটতম।

৭৫। অধ্যায়ের প্রথমাংশক্রমে: বিষাদবিপর্যয়-মাত্রে সমাহারান।

৭৬। কাজদ্বয়মুখি বিষাদনাগামসমূহ সম্প্রতি, ভয়ের সাক্ষাৎ প্রচূর্বে বিদিত।

৭৭। নিয়মান্ত্রণ বিপর্যয়। যথার্থ মহাত্মার রূপনির্মিতি।

৭৮। স্বাভাবিক যাত্রায়ে যাত্রার প্রথমাংশ: ব্যাখ্যাতায় কথা।

dনির্দিষ্ট বিপর্যয়ের অভ্যাস।

৭৯। প্রাপ্তায়নির্দিষ্ট প্রায়োগিকর্থ সাক্ষাত্রক।

৮০। সমসাময়ীকবর্তী সূক্ষ্ম। প্রতিনিধিত্ব ক্রিয়াকলাপ সাক্ষাত্রক।

৮১। অন্ধ্যা কাম। ক্ষুণ্ণ দেশ। ক্ষুন্নি প্রয়োগ।

৮২। স্থিরের উন্নতি ধর্মে। বিশিষ্টকক্ষজ্ঞ-জাতিসংখ্যাঃ।
३३। बुधवारेत् ०८ नागराजसमाचर्यिरेषुगुणाः।
३४। बुधवारेत् महादेव दिव्यसागर विष्णु अभि- 
श्रेयसा। क्रिकाकृति वर्धना। अभिव्यक्ती जीविकाः।
३५। वंशार्थिविशेष ब्राहम भावना स्त्रिकलक्षणमेव। 
शेषो तृणवालिण चतुष्ठयमानी वृत्तिः। अनुभवजना 
सूतिकेशुभाषना गायमानांष्ठिताः। चरित्रेभाषन भोजन 
प्राप्तापक्षाः स्थिरिष्यमपास्तां अंत्तिष्ठिती वृत्तिः। इति गुणाः।
३६। चुन्द्रबलब वाकाः। अर्जुनेदास यथा ऐतिहासिक 
वस्तुदेश संयोगचेतुष्ठत्ववेषम्। अधिवृत्त- 
संयोगचेतुष्ठवेषम्। सूक्ष्मचक्रसंयोग 
चेतुष्ठकुष्णम्। चिन्हचक्रसंयोग 
चेतुष्ठस्वभावः। प्रचलितसंयोग 
स्बभावः। अन्यन वर्ण गर्भन धृतिकथा 
चतुष्ठयमेनामाश्रयति॥
३७। नित्यसंकलनं तु नामान्य तारागमनं नागम्य 
कामव्रतिः। तद्विद्विधं प्रभापरमेवहात्। परं 
सत्ता। अपरं चात्मकं चतुष्ठकालेः।
३८। नित्यद्रव्यसंकलनं अचासनिककार विशेषाः॥
३९। नित्यसंकलनं समायं चतुष्ठकालेः।
उत्कृष्ट: । यथार्थेयमधये एकपराश्रितसमाव-निष्ठते नावायुक्तसिद्धा । अर्थवाचवधवनै गुणगुणिने। क्रियाक्रियावनलै। जातिवश्यकी विशेषनिष्ठद्वै चेति।

८०। चनादि: वान्तः प्रागमावः उत्पत्तिः पूर्वं कार्यं भादररन्तः प्रधानं: उत्प-चनन्तरं कार्यं। वैकालिकसंस्करणात्वविच्छेद-प्रतियोगिकीकार्यविभागः। यथा भूने घटा नाशीयी। तदात्म्यमभवविच्छेदप्रतियो-गितिकी वन्यवामाबाचः। यथा घट: पटानं न भव-नीति।

८१। सविस्तः पदार्थानां यथायथमुक्तेयनं-भेदात्म्यनेव पदार्थां इति सिद्धम्।

८२। कणाद्यमन्येयोवांच्युतपतिस्तिसद्य।

अन्नभूतेन विदुषा रचितस्तरकंसंयोः।

इति श्री तर्कसंयोः समाप्तः।